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Banning Virtual Child Pornography: Is There Any Way
Around Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition?
Our nation has an undeniable interest in protecting children and
punishing those who harm them.' At the same time, our nation
values freedom of speech and has made significant efforts to ensure
the preservation of this freedom.2 Inevitably, instances arise where
these two interests clash.3 On April 16, 2002, the U.S. Supreme Court
held in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition4 that the provisions of the
Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 ("CPPA") 5 banning
virtual child pornography 6 encroached on freedom of speech and
were therefore unconstitutional.7
Immediately following this
decision, proponents of the CPPA vowed to create new legislation
that would both accomplish their goal of banning virtual child
pornography and meet the Court's standard for constitutionality.8
1. See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1944) (stating that "[a]
democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon the healthy, well-rounded growth of
young people into full maturity as citizens").
2. See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances.").
3. For example, the Supreme Court acknowledged a conflict between efforts to
protect children and freedom of speech in New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982). In
Ferber, the Court considered the constitutionality of a state statute that prohibited the
distribution of child pornography. Id. at 749. The Court recognized that "laws directed at
the dissemination of child pornography run the risk of suppressing protected expression by
allowing the hand of the censor to become unduly heavy," but ultimately upheld the
statute. Id. at 756.
4. 535 U.S. 234 (2002).
5. Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. A, sec. 121, 110 Stat. 3009-26 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C.A §§ 2241(c), 2243(a), 2251(d), 2252(b), 2252A, 2256(5)-(9), 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000aa
(West 2000 & Supp. 2003)).
6. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B), (D) (2000). In Free Speech Coalition, the Court defined
"virtual child pornography" as including "computer-generated images as well as images
produced by more traditional means." Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 241. The Court,
in finding the statute unconstitutionally overbroad, explained that "the literal terms of the
statute embrace a Renaissance painting depicting a scene from classical mythology, a
'picture' that 'appears to be, of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct.' " Id.
(quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B) (2000)).
7. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 258. Specifically, the Court found § 2256(8)(B)
and § 2256(8)(D) unconstitutionally overbroad. Id. at 258.
8. See David G. Savage, Ban on 'Virtual' Child Porn Is Upset by Court, L.A. TIMES,
Apr. 17, 2002, at Al (quoting Attorney General John Ashcroft as saying, "I am committed
to working with the Congress to develop strong measures to fight child pornography that
will survive judicial scrutiny").
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This Recent Development provides an introduction to the CPPA
and discusses the Supreme Court's rationale for finding the CPPA
unconstitutional in Free Speech Coalition. It then examines the
actions taken by Congress following the Free Speech Coalition
decision, which attempted to justify legislation banning virtual child
pornography and to restore the prohibitions of the CPPA. Finally,
this Recent Development considers the constitutionality of the
legislation passed by Congress following Free Speech Coalition and
concludes that the goal of protecting children and preventing illegal
child pornography could best be served by legislation that
incorporates established limitations on speech and stronger
enforcement of existing federal obscenity laws.
In response to the Court's decision in Free Speech Coalition,
members of Congress have proposed new legislation banning virtual
child pornography. To better understand how forthcoming legislation
can pass constitutional muster, a brief overview of the legislation
struck down in Free Speech Coalition is useful. In 1996, Congress
enacted the CPPA, which banned both the use of actual children and
virtual images of children in the production of pornography.9
Congress specifically prohibited
any visual depiction, including any photograph, film, video,
picture, or computer or computer-generated image or
picture, whether made or produced by electronic,
mechanical, or other means, of sexually explicit conduct,
where ... such visual depiction is, or appears to be, of a
minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; ... [or] such
visual depiction is advertised, promoted, presented,
described, or distributed in such a manner that conveys the
impression that the material is or contains a visual depiction
of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct."

9. The decision to enact legislation that banned the use of virtual images of children

was supported by the congressional finding that:
the effect of visual depictions of child sexual activity on a child molester or

pedophile using that material to stimulate or whet his own sexual appetites, or on
a child where the material is being used as a means of seducing or breaking down
the child's inhibitions to sexual abuse or exploitation, is the same whether the
child pornography consists of photographic depictions of actual children or visual
depictions produced wholly or in part by electronic, mechanical, or other means,
including by computer, which are virtually indistinguishable to the unsuspecting

viewer from photographic images of actual children.
Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, § 1,110 Stat. at 3009-26 to 3009-27.
10. Id. § 2, 110 Stat. at 3009-28 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8) (2000)) (emphasis
added).
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Additionally, the CPPA provided an affirmative defense for
producers who could demonstrate that their material was produced
using only adults and was not marketed with the suggestion that real
children were depicted therein."
From its enactment, the CPPA triggered controversy over its
constitutionality under the First Amendment."2
Most notably,
defendants sought to avoid conviction by asserting that the CPPA is
unconstitutional due to both overbreadth and vagueness. 3
Particularly, defendants claimed that the phrases "appears to be"'4
and "conveys the impression"' 5 are both overbroad and vague.
Over the years, appellate decisions yielded inconsistent findings
on the CPPA's constitutionality. 6 In Free Speech Coalition v. Reno, 7
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found the
CPPA unconstitutional, 8 while other appellate courts sustained the
law's constitutionality. 9
While appellate courts left the constitutionality of the CPPA
unsettled, the Supreme Court did not consider the issue until 2001,
11. Id. § 3, 110 Stat. at 3009-29 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A § 2252A(c) (West
2000 & Supp. 2003)).
12. Compare Debra D. Burke, The Criminalizationof Virtual Child Pornography: A
Constitutional Question, 34 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 439, 470 (1997) (anticipating that the
Court would find the "appears to be" provision of the CPPA unconstitutional), with
Adam J. Wasserman, Virtual.Child.Porn.Com: Defending the Constitutionality of the
Criminalization of Computer-Generated Child Pornography by the Child Pornography
Prevention Act of 1996-A Reply to Professor Burke and Other Critics, 35 HARV. J. ON
LEGIs. 245, 281-82 (1998) (arguing that the CPPA is constitutional).
13. See, e.g., United States v. Fox, 248 F.3d 394, 399 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that the
CPPA violated the First Amendment), vacated, 535 U.S. 1014 (2001) (mem.); United
States v. Mento, 231 F.3d 912, 917 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding that the CPPA is impermissibly
overbroad and vague), vacated, 535 U.S. 1014 (2001) (mem.); Free Speech Coalition v.
Reno, 198 F.3d 1083, 1087 (9th Cir. 1999) (arguing the CPPA is unconstitutional), afjd
sub nom. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002); United States v.
Acheson, 195 F.3d 645, 648 (11th Cir. 1999) (disputing the constitutionality of the CPPA);
United States v. Hilton, 167 F.3d 61, 65 (1st Cir. 1999) (arguing that the CPPA is
unconstitutionally vague), affd in part and rev'd in part, 257 F.3d 50 (1st Cir. 2001).
14. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B) (2000).
15. § 2256(8)(D); see, e.g., Free Speech Coalition, 198 F.3d at 1087 (stating the
defendant's argument "that where the statute fails to define 'appears to be' and 'conveys
the impression,' it is so vague a person of ordinary intelligence cannot understand what is
prohibited").
16. See, e.g., Free Speech Coalition, 198 F.3d at 1086 (holding that the CPPA is
unconstitutionally overbroad). But see Fox, 248 F.3d at 404 (holding that the CPPA does
not violate the First Amendment); Mento, 231 F.3d at 923 (same); Acheson, 195 F.3d at
650 (same); Hilton, 167 F.3d at 61 (same).
17. 198 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 1999), affd sub nom. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition,
535 U.S. 234 (2002).
18. Id. at 1097.
19. See supra note 16.

2003]

BANNING VIRTUAL CHILD PORNOGRAPHY

2139

when it granted certiorari in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition." An
examination of three prior Supreme Court decisions, Miller v.
22 and Osborne v. Ohio, 3 provides
California,2' New York v. Ferber,

the basis to understand the Court's rationale in Free Speech Coalition.
In Miller, the Court considered the constitutionality of a
California statute that prohibited the distribution of obscene
material.2 4 In concluding that the First Amendment does not protect

obscene material,' the Miller opinion set forth a three-prong test for
establishing obscenity.26 First, a proponent for finding a work to be

obscene must establish that " 'the average person, applying
contemporary community standards' would find that the work, taken
as a whole, appeals to the'prurient interest. '27 Second, the work must
depict or describe, "in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct

specifically defined by the applicable state law. ''28 Finally, one must
demonstrate that "the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary,
20. 531 U.S. 1124 (2001) (granting certiorari).
21. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
22. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
23. 495 U.S. 103 (1990).
24. Miller, 413 U.S. at 16-18.
25. Id. at 23. The Miller Court held obscene materials to be outside the protection of
the First Amendment. Id. It is important to note that Miller only applies to the
distribution of obscene material. Id. In Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), the Court
held that a statute prohibiting the possession of obscene material was unconstitutional. Id.
at 559. However, the Court has applied Stanley narrowly. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 996 (2d ed. 2002) (noting that in
United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351 (1971), the Court refused to extend Stanley to protect
the receipt of obscene materials).
26. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
27. Id. (quoting Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229, 230 (1972) (per curiam) (quoting
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957))). The Court justified the application of a
"community standard" rather than a national standard: "It is neither realistic nor
constitutionally sound to read the First Amendment as requiring that the people of Maine
or Mississippi accept public depiction of conduct found tolerable in Las, Vegas, or New
York City." Id. at 32. Notably, this standard presents a problem with respect to the
Internet, where the attitudes of the people of different states may be blurred. See Belinda
Tiosavljevic, A Field Day for Child Pornographersand Pedophiles If the Ninth Circuit Gets
Its Way: Striking Down the Constitutionaland Necessary Child PornographyAct of 1996,
42 S.TEx. L. REV. 545, 546 (2001) (discussing how technology has contributed to the
production and distribution of both real and virtual child pornography); Matthew K.
Wegner, Note, Teaching Old Dogs New Tricks: Why Traditional Free Speech Doctrine
Supports Anti-Child-PornographyRegulations in Virtual Reality, 85 MINN. L. REV. 2081,
2111 (2001) (arguing that "[tihe synthetic creation and rapid dissemination of both
obscene images and pornography across traditional geographic boundaries is ample
justification for a new national [obscenity] standard").
28. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24. As one critic of the Miller test commented: "The first two
parts of [the Miller test] are incoherent: to put it crudely, they require the audience to be
turned on and grossed out at the same time." Kathleen M. Sullivan, The FirstAmendment
Wars, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 28,1992, at 35, 38.
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To establish a work as
obscene, the requirements of all three prongs of this test must be
met.30
While Miller established the three-prong test for obscenity, a
form of unprotected speech, in New York v. Ferber the Court
recognized an additional category of speech that was not protected by
the First Amendment: child pornography. In Ferber, the Court
considered the constitutionality of a New York statute that prohibited
the distribution of material depicting children engaged in sexual
activity.3 Ferber held that child pornography is another category of
material not protected by the First Amendment, regardless of
whether it is obscene under the Miller test.32 The Court justified its
creation of a new category of unprotected speech by reasoning that "a
State's interest in 'safeguarding the physical and psychological wellbeing of a minor' is 'compelling.' "I' Moreover, the Court found that
the distribution and sale of child pornography is "intrinsically related
to the sexual abuse of children" in two ways: first, child pornography
serves as a permanent record to the child, whose abuse is documented
in the material, and second, "the distribution network for child
pornography must be closed if the production of material which
requires the sexual exploitation of children is to be effectively
controlled."34 Finally, the Court noted that the value of child
pornography is "exceedingly modest, if not de minimis."3
29. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24. In requiring "serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value," the Court rejected the standard previously applied in Memoirs v. Massachusetts,
383 U.S. 413 (1966), which required that the material be "utterly without redeeming
value." Miller, 413 U.S. at 24-25 (quoting Memoirs, 383 U.S. at 419).
30. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 756.
33. Id. at 756-57 (quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607
(1982)).
34. Id. at 759. Congressional hearings have focused on the relationship between
production and distribution. See, e.g., id. at 760 n.l (citing Sexual Exploitation of
Children: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the House Judiciary Comm., 95th
Cong. 34 (1977) (statement of Charles Rembar) ("It is an impossible prosecutorial job to
try to get at the acts themselves.")).
35. Id. at 762. The three-prong test for obscenity defined in Miller indicated that the
value of speech is a consideration in finding the material to be outside the ambit of the
First Amendment, at least with respect to obscenity laws. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24. The
marketplace of ideas theory stresses the importance of freedom even for unpopular
speech: "[O]nly in an unfettered marketplace of ideas can truth ultimately be discovered."
Kelly Guglielmi, Virtual Child Pornography as a New Category of Unprotected Speech, 9
CoMMLAW CONSPECTUS 207, 215 (2001). With respect to virtual child pornography and
its value, some argue that "virtual child pornography is not necessary to reach an ultimate
truth" and thus does not contribute to the marketplace of ideas. Id. at 216. In considering
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After holding that production and distribution can be
constitutionally prohibited, the Court considered whether mere
possession of child pornography could be proscribed in Osborne v.
Ohio.36 In Osborne, the Court considered the constitutionality of an
Ohio statute that prohibited the possession of material depicting
children in the nude. 37 It upheld the statute based on the conclusion
that states have a compelling interest in protecting children.3 8
With this precedent in mind, the Supreme Court decided
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition in 2002. The Free Speech Coalition
represented a number of parties who believed that the CPPA
threatened the work they produced.39 The case came to the Supreme
Court following the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit's decision that the CPPA was unconstitutionally overbroad.4 °
The Court identified the issue before it as "whether the CPPA is
constitutional where it proscribes a significant universe of speech that
is neither obscene under Miller nor child pornography under
Ferber.'41 In analyzing the CPPA, the Court found that the "appears
to be" and "conveys the impression" provisions were overbroad.42
the value of child pornography, the Ferber Court found it "unlikely that visual depictions
of children performing sexual acts or lewdly exhibiting their genitals would often
constitute an important and necessary part of a literary performance of scientific or
educational work." Ferber,458 U.S. at 762-63.
36. 495 U.S. 103, 108 (1990).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 110. The Court was further persuaded by the State's argument that, "since
the time of [the] decision in Ferber, much of the child pornography market has been
driven underground; as a result, it is difficult, if not impossible, to solve the child
pornography problem by only attacking production and distribution." Id.
39. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 243 (2002). For example,
members of the Free Speech Coalition feared that even if they could show that only adults
were used in the production of their works, the affirmative defense would not protect
them if these works were promoted in such a way that "conveys the impression" that
children were therein engaging in sexually explicit conduct. Id. at 242 (citing 18 U.S.C.
§ 2256(8)(D) (2000)).
40. See Free Speech Coalition v. Reno, 198 F.3d 1083, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding
that "the language 'appears to be a minor' set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B) and the
language 'conveys the impression' set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(D) are
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad"), affid sub nom. Ashcroft v. Free Speech
Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002).
41. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 240. The Court explained that the CPPA
proscribes material beyond that which would satisfy the Miller obscenity standard. Id.
The Court also found the material proscribed by the CPPA distinguishable from that in
Ferber. Id. In Ferber,the Court allowed the government to prohibit child pornography
based on the government's interest in protecting children who may be exploited in
production. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 757 (1982). The material addressed by the
CPPA, unlike the material in Ferber, does not involve the use of real children in
production. See Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 250-51.
42. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 258.
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Ultimately, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Ninth
Circuit, finding the CPPA unconstitutional. 3
The government advanced four major arguments in support of
the CPPA's constitutionality. First, the government asserted that
virtual child pornography harms actual children in that "pedophiles
may use virtual child pornography to seduce children. '44 Second, the
government argued that "virtual child pornography whets the
appetite of pedophiles and encourages them to engage in illegal
conduct. ' 45 Third, the government claimed that its "objective of
eliminating the market for pornography produced using real children
necessitates a prohibition on virtual images as well. '46 Finally, the
government argued that the existence of virtual child pornography
makes it more difficult to prosecute defendants who use actual
children in pornography;47 that is, defendants could possibly evade
prosecution for using actual children in the production of
pornography by claiming that the images are computer-generated or
images of young-looking adults. 48 Thus, the government asserted that
it would be left with the heavy burden of proving that the material
was produced using a real child.49
Before specifically addressing each of the government's
arguments, the Court considered the constitutionality of the CPPA
and found that the legislation prohibited speech regardless of whether
it met the obscenity test under Miller." The Court explained that the
material proscribed by the CPPA did not necessarily "appeal to the
prurient interest," as required by the first prong of the Miller test."
Furthermore, the CPPA prohibited work that would not qualify as
"patently offensive" under Miller's second prong as the CPPA
prohibited work that explores common themes of today's society,
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id.
Id. at 251.
Id. at 253.
Id. at 254.

47. Id. at 254-55.

48. See id. at 242.
49. See id. Congress found that "computers and computer imaging technology can be
used to... alter sexually explicit photographs, films, and videos in such a way as to make it
virtually impossible for unsuspecting viewers to identify individuals or to determine if the
offending material was produced using real children." Child Pornography Prevention Act
of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. A, sec. 121, § 1, 110 Stat. 3009-26, 3009-26. Arguably,

current technology also makes it "virtually impossible" for prosecutors to establish that
real children were involved in production.
50. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 246-47.

51. Id. at 246. The Court illustrated that "[t]he CPPA applies to a picture in a
psychology manual, as well as a movie depicting the horrors of sexual abuse." Id.; see also
supra notes 25-30 and accompanying text.
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themes that our society has accepted as depictions of reality.52
Finally, the Court found that the CPPA gave no consideration to the
value of the speech as mandated by Miller's third prong. 3 The Court
concluded that "the CPPA cannot be read to prohibit obscenity,
because it lacks the required link between its prohibitions and the
affront to community standards prohibited by the definition of
obscenity."54
The Court subsequently distinguished the material proscribed by
the CPPA from that at issue in Ferber. The Court explained that the
Ferber-warranted ban on child pornography only applies to child
That is, the
pornography that is produced using actual children.
Ferberdecision did not speak to the content of the material but rather

only to how it was produced.56 Unlike pornography involving the use
of actual children, which requires the abuse of actual children in its
making, the Court found that "the CPPA prohibits speech that
records no crime and creates no victims in its production."57 The

Court reasoned that the harm to actual children resulting from the
production of virtual child pornography was too speculative. 8
Additionally, the Court explained that Ferber did not declare child
pornography unconditionally without value and, therefore, the CPPA

was not justified in prohibiting such speech as valueless. 9 Although
Ferber indicated that child pornography often lacks value as speech,
the Court reasoned that child pornography is not "by definition

52. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 247-48. In particular, the Court addressed the
theme of teenagers and sexual activity, using two recent, successful movies, Traffic and
American Beauty, to illustrate that this theme is both pervasive and accepted by society
and, therefore, not patently offensive. Id.
53. Id. at 246. The Court acknowledged that some material proscribed by the CPPA
might have value. "Art and literature express the vital interest we all have in the
formative years we ourselves once knew, when wounds can be so grievous, disappointment
so profound, and mistaken choices so tragic, but when moral acts and self-fulfillment are
still in reach." Id. at 248. Thus, the Court recognized that materials that might violate the
CPPA may have artistic value.
54. Id. at 249. In other words, the Court concluded that the CPPA does not just
prohibit obscenity, which may be justified on the basis of the Miller holding.
55. Id. But see Alison R. Gladoway, Has the Computer Revolution Placed Our
Children in Danger?: A Closer Look at the Child PornographyPrevention Act of 1996, 8
CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 21, 36 (2001) (claiming that virtual child pornography "poses
the same threats and dangers to children" as the material in Ferber).
56. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 249.
57. Id. at 250.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 251. The Ferber Court acknowledged that material may satisfy the value
requirement of Miller, yet still "embody the hardest core of child pornography." New
York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 761 (1982).
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without value."6 In fact, the Court pointed out, Ferber specifically
left open the option of using virtual images as an alternative means of
producing the same material without harming children in the
process.61

Finally, the Court analyzed the CPPA through the lens of
Osborne, a case in which the Court allowed the state to prohibit
possession of child pornography.62 The Court explained that Osborne
"anchored its holding" on the state's compelling concern for children
who are abused in the production of pornography.63 The CPPA is
distinguishable from Osborne because the material sought to be
proscribed by the CPPA does not involve actual children.'
Therefore, the compelling interest that was crucial to the Court's
decision in Osborne is too indirect to be a compelling interest for
banning virtual child pornography.
After establishing that the CPPA was "inconsistent with Miller
and [found] no support in Ferber,"65 the Court specifically addressed

each of the government's arguments for upholding the CPPA. First,
the Court considered the government's argument that virtual child
pornography may be used to encourage children to participate in

sexual activity.66 The Court was not persuaded by this justification for
the CPPA67 and noted that there are "many things innocent in

themselves" that may be misused for such purposes but, nonetheless,
may not be prohibited.68 Furthermore, the Court was unimpressed
with the government's argument that virtual child pornography whets

the appetites of pedophiles and may lead them to abuse actual
children.69 The Court explained: "The mere tendency of speech to
60. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 251. The Court noted, "On the contrary, the
[Ferber] Court recognized some works in this category might have significant value." Id.
As the prohibition of child pornography in Ferber was justified based on the method of
production, where that justification is absent, it is difficult to argue that material of value
should escape the protection of the First Amendment.
61. Id. " 'If it were necessary for literary or artistic value, a person over the statutory
age who perhaps looked younger could be utilized. Simulation outside the prohibition of
the statute could provide another alternative.' " Id. (quoting New York v. Ferber, 458
U.S. 747, 763 (1982)).
62. Id. at 250; see Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 110 (1990).
63. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 250.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 251.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 252 (" '[G]overnmental interest in protecting children from harmful
materials ... does not justify an unnecessarily broad suppression of speech addressed to
adults.' " (quoting Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997))).
68. Id. at 251.
69. Id. at 253.

2003]

BANNING VIRTUAL CHILD PORNOGRAPHY

2145

encourage unlawful acts is not a sufficient reason for banning it."7
Additionally, the government's argument that the prohibition of
virtual child pornography is necessary to eliminate the market for
child pornography did not convince the Court.7 1 Rather, the Court
concluded that the abuse of real children may actually decrease if
similar images could be produced legally.72 Next, the Court examined
the government's fourth argument, that virtual child pornography
hinders the prosecution of producers who use actual children to make
pornography.73 The Court interpreted this argument as rationalizing
the prohibition of protected speech as a means of banning
unprotected speech.74
The Court rejected the government's
argument, explaining that the overbreadth doctrine provides that
unprotected speech may not be banned if, as a result, a significant
amount of protected speech is prohibited. 5
Finally, the Court found that the affirmative defense provided
for in the CPPA was "incomplete and insufficient" and, therefore, did
not pass constitutional muster.7 6 First, the Court established that the
statute imposed too heavy a burden on defendants to prove that the
material was produced using only adults.77 Second, the Court found
that the affirmative defense applied inconsistently to producers and
70. Id. The Court further contended that "First Amendment freedoms are most in
danger when the government seeks to control thought or to justify its laws for that
impermissible end." Id. The Court has recognized a limited number of situations when
the government may suppress speech that advocates violating the law but only when "such
advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite
or produce such action." Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). In Free Speech
Coalition, the Court found that there was "no attempt, incitement, solicitation, or
conspiracy. The government has shown no more than a remote connection between
speech that might encourage thoughts or impulses and any resulting child abuse." Free
Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 253.
71. Free Speech Coalition,535 U.S. at 254.
72. Id. (stating that "few pornographers would risk prosecution by abusing real
children if fictional, computerized images would suffice").
73. Id. at 254-55.
74. Id.
75. Id. The Court elaborated: " 'The possible harm to society in permitting some
unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that protected
speech of others may be muted.' " Id. at 255 (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S.
601, 612 (1973)).
76. Id. at 255-56. The government argued that the CPPA was not a suppression of
speech, but rather only shifted the burden to the defendant to prove that the speech was
lawful. Id. at 255.
77. Id. "If the evidentiary issue is a serious problem for the government, as it asserts,
it will be at least as difficult for the innocent possessor." Id. at 255-56. But see infra notes
87-88 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Thomas's concurring opinion and the
idea that an affirmative defense could possibly redeem the constitutionality of a statute
prohibiting this type of material).
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possessors.7 8 Unlike producers, possessors could not avail themselves

of the affirmative defense by showing that only adults were used in
production.79 Consequently, possessors may be subject to prosecution
even if they can meet the difficult burden of proving that children
were not used in the production of the material. 8° Furthermore, the
CPPA's affirmative defense only applies to producers who can
demonstrate that they used only adults in the production of their

material;8 the use of computer-generated images does not fall under
the affirmative defense provision.82 Therefore, producers may be
subject to prosecution even when they can demonstrate that no actual
children were involved in the production of their material.
Under this analysis of the CPPA, and in light of precedent, the
Supreme Court found that the CPPA phrases "appears to be" and
"conveys the impression" prohibits protected speech and is therefore

unconstitutional.83 The Court noted that the constitutionality of the
CPPA depended on the creation of a new category of unprotected

speech for virtual child pornography,84 a step the Court was unwilling
to take. In essence, the Court's concern with the overbreadth of the
CPPA led to its conclusion that the law is unconstitutional because it

78. Id. at 256.
79. Id. Possessors of child pornography, while not directly involved in the production
of the pornography, contribute to the harm by creating a market for material created
through the abuse of children. See Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 109 (1990). Therefore,
prohibiting possession of such material is justified in the interest of protecting the victims
of child pornography. Id. at 109-10. While this rationale for proscribing the possession of
actual child pornography makes sense, it is subject to criticism when applied to virtual
child pornography, where no children are harmed in the production of the material.
80. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 256.
81. Id.
82. Id. In other words, a producer is not protected by the affirmative defense if a
nonchild method of production was used but that method did not involve adults.
83. Id. at 258.
84. Id. at 245-46. Notably, Judge Ferguson of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit advocated this exact view in his dissent. See Free Speech Coalition v.
Reno, 198 F.3d 1083, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) (Ferguson, J., dissenting) (arguing that "virtual
child pornography should join the ranks of real child pornography as a class of speech
outside the protection of the First Amendment"), affd sub nor Ashcroft v. Free Speech
Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002).
85. Historically, the Court has recognized that there are "inherent dangers of
undertaking to regulate any form of expression." Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23
(1972). In Ferber, where the Court created a new category of unprotected speech--child
pornography-the Court justified the classification because "the evil to be restricted so
overwhelmingly outweighs the expressive interests, if any, at stake, that no process of caseby-case adjudication is required." New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763-64 (1982). In
essence, the government did not convince the Court in Free Speech Coalition that the evils
of virtual child pornography outweighed First Amendment values.
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is inconsistent with the principle that "[t]he government may not
suppress lawful speech as the means to suppress unlawful speech."86
Although the Court struck down the CPPA as unconstitutionally
overbroad in Free Speech Coalition, the possibility remained that
virtual child pornography could be prohibited in a manner that would
survive judicial scrutiny. For example, Justice Thomas, in his
concurring opinion, acknowledged that there may be some
constitutional means of prohibiting virtual child pornography. 7
Specifically, Justice Thomas noted that "[t]he Court does leave open
the possibility that a more complete affirmative defense could save a
statute's constitutionality." 8 In other words, legislation may be
constitutional if it overcomes the Court's concerns regarding the
affirmative defense's inconsistent application to producers and
possessors and lack of application to producers who use only virtual
images.
In part due to the words of Justice Thomas, proponents of the
virtual child pornography prohibition were hopeful that the substance
of the CPPA could be rescued from complete destruction. Without
delay, supporters of the CPPA sought alternative approaches for
banning virtual child pornography.89 This Recent Development
examines potential avenues for reconciling the goal of prohibiting
virtual child pornography with the First Amendment and considers
the potential success of each approach.
One approach taken by Congress is demonstrated in the effort to
prove that virtual child pornography is related to the harm of real
children. Following the Free Speech Coalition decision, Congress
promptly made inquiries into the future harmful effects that child
pornography may have on children.9" The investigation focused on
86. Free Speech Coalition,535 U.S. at 255.
87. Id. at 259 (Thomas, J., concurring).
88. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
89. One of these approaches is the joint resolution introduced in the House of
Representatives proposing an amendment to the Constitution. H.R.J. Res. 106, 107th
Cong. (2002). The proposed amendment reads:
Section 1. Neither the Constitution nor any State constitution shall be
construed to protect child pornography, defined as visual depictions by any
technological means of minor persons, whether actual or virtual, engaged in
explicit sexual activity.
Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce this article by
appropriate legislation.
Id. Because of the challenge of adding constitutional amendments, this proposal is beyond
the scope of this Recent Development and will not be considered here.
90. See, e.g., Enhancing Child ProtectionLaws After the April 16, 2002 Supreme Court
Decision, Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime,
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harm that occurs, not in the production, but rather as a result of the
circulation of such material. On May 1, 2002, the House of
Representatives called on thd Unit Chief of the FBI's Crimes Against
Children Unit, Michael J. Heimbach, to report on this subject.9 Mr.
Heimbach testified that, to his knowledge:
(1) "there is [a] connection between those who trade or
possess child pornography and those who molest children;"
(2) "child molesters use child pornography to seduce
children;" and
(3) "child pornography can sexually arouse [individuals
that have a predisposed sexual interest in children], fuel
their sexual fantasies about children, validate their sexual
attraction to children, and help them rationalize this
behavior."92
Furthermore, Mr. Heimbach reported that "[t]here is every reason to
believe that offenders who obtain and distribute [computergenerated] images on the Internet can and will use them in much the
93
same manner that they currently use images with real child victims.
Overall, Mr. Heimbach's testimony conveyed that virtual child
pornography, like actual child pornography, threatens to harm real
children.94
The information provided to the House of Representatives
speaks to the Supreme Court's finding that harm to actual children is
"contingent and indirect."95 Congress thus appears to be attempting
to strengthen the connection between virtual child pornography and
harm to actual children. Our society has a strong interest in
protecting all children from harm, not just those abused in the

Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong.
(2002) (report of Michael J. Heimbach, Unit Chief, Crimes Against Children Unit, Federal
Bureau of Investigation) [hereinafter Heimbach Report], available at http://www.house.
gov/judiciary/70366.pdf (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
91. Id. at 6-13. For this testimony, Mr. Heimbach relied on information provided by
the FBI's National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime's ("NCAVC") Behavioral
Analysis Unit ("BAU"). Id. at 8 (stating that the testimony was based on information
collected by the NCAVC and the BAU in their extensive investigations of child sex abuse
and their many interviews with child sex offenders).
92. Id. at 8-10.
93. Id. at 11-12.
94. Id. at 6-13.
95. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 250 (2002). The Court found that
"[t]he harm [allegedly related to virtual child pornography] does not follow from the
speech, but depends upon some unquantified potential for subsequent criminal acts." Id.
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production of child pornography.96 If a significant relationship
between virtual child pornography and harm to actual children can be
substantiated, the harm of Ivirtuial -child pornography to children
begins to resemble the harm discussed in Ferber, where harm to
children warranted the creation of a category of unprotected speech.
Hence, the Ferber rationale is arguably applicable here, and thus the
Court should develop a special category of unprotected speech.
These congressional efforts to pass legislation that would survive
constitutional challenges are likely to fail. The link between virtual
child pornography and actual harm to children will not likely be
verified to the extent that real child pornography was connected to
actual harm in Ferber. In Ferber,the pornographic material involved
was a product of child abuse and, therefore, served as documentation
that the abuse had occurred. 97 It is difficult to imagine a study of
virtual child pornography that could prove such an irrefutable
connection as the alleged child abuse would unlikely be documented
in the same manner. Even if Congress could establish such a
relationship, Ferber could still be distinguished as creating only a
production-based prohibition, while the effect that virtual child
pornography has in circulation is a content-based argument. That is,
in Ferber, the Court was concerned with the harm that resulted to
children from involving them in production and prohibited child
pornography on that basis, not because of the substance of the
material produced.98
Another approach suggested to uphold the prohibition of virtual
child pornography is exemplified through efforts to prove that virtual
child pornography hinders the prosecution of real child pornography
offenders. In light of this possibility, Congress has requested reports
examining the effect of legalization of virtual child pornography on
prosecution efforts under existing child pornography laws.99 This
investigation stems from the government's assertion in Free Speech
Coalition that defendants who use actual children in the production of
pornography may defend themselves by arguing that an image is
96. The Supreme Court has supported statutes that prohibit child pornography for
reasons other than protecting the child abused in production. See Osborne v. Ohio, 495
U.S. 103, 111 (1990) (noting the state's interest in prohibiting child pornography from
being used to lure other children); see also Wasserman supra note 12, at 266 (stating that
Osborne "signals the Court's willingness to accept states' justifications for child
pornography statutes that do not involve protecting the children exploited in the
pornography's creation").
97. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
98. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756-57 (1982).
99. See Heimbach Report, supra note 90, at 6-13.
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legal, made using only computer-generated images. 1°° In response to
Congress's request, the FBI reported that although most images of
child pornography are produced using actual children, experts are
unable to show with scientific certainty that a particular image was

produced using an identifiable child.' 0' The FBI further reported that
this loophole may enable offenders who use actual children in
producing pornography to evade prosecution.

2

At least one member of the Court, Justice Thomas, found this
argument to be a persuasive point.0 3 In his concurring opinion,
Justice Thomas left open the possibility that, "if technological

advances thwart prosecution of 'unlawful speech,' the government
may well have a compelling interest in barring or otherwise regulating
some narrow category of 'lawful speech' in order to enforce
effectively laws against pornography made through the abuse of real
children."'0 4 That is, if the government could substantiate that
offenders of actual child pornography were avoiding prosecution, a
ban on virtual child pornography might be justified.
The problem with the government's argument, as articulated by
the Court, was that the government did not identify any cases that
demonstrate that hindrance to prosecution is a legitimate concern.0 5

Until the government can unequivocally show that pornographers
who use actual children are evading conviction, the Supreme Court
will most likely maintain the position that the hindrance to
prosecution argument is too speculative.
Following the reports to Congress concerning virtual child
pornography, Congress developed new legislation aimed at banning
100. See Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 241-42.
101. Heimbach Report, supra note 90, at 11. Some supporters of this position have
gone so far as to argue that "[cjomputer-generated child pornography.., supplies a 'builtin reasonable doubt standard in every child exploitation/pornography prosecution.' "
Wasserman, supra note 12, at 269 (quoting Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1995:
Hearings on S. 1237 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1996)
(statement of Bruce Taylor, President and Chief Counsel, Nat'l Law Center for Children
and Families)).
102. See Heimbach Report, supra note 90, at 11.
103. See Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 259 (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
104. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring). In Free Speech Coalition, the Court explained that
the overbreadth doctrine "prohibits the government from banning unprotected speech if a
substantial amount of protected speech is prohibited or chilled in the process." Id. at 255.
Arguably, a more narrow construction of the language used in the CPPA would ensure
that a "substantial amount" of protected speech would not be swept into the prohibition
and this result, in conjunction with the alleged difficulty the government faces in
prosecuting actual child pornography offenders, would be enough to warrant banning
virtual child pornography.
105. Id. at 259 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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such material. On March, 6, 2003, the House of Representatives
introduced the Child Obscenity and Pornography Prevention Act of
2003 ("COPPA"). 0 6 In an attempt to circumvent the decision in Free
Speech Coalition, Congress modified the language used in the CPPA
to prohibit virtual child pornography. Congress addressed many of
the Court's criticisms of the CPPA in drafting the COPPA.
Most noteworthy, the COPPA revises § 2256(8)(B) of the CPPA
by replacing the "appears to be" language with "is, or is
indistinguishable from." 107 The modified language of the COPPA
appears to be an attempt by Congress to more narrowly define
prohibited material.10 8 The phrase "is, or is indistinguishable from,"
however, still leaves room for criticism."° Arguably, this language
remains too ambiguous and poses many of the same problems of the
original "appears to be" language of the CPPA;1 10 that is, it is still
possible that material that is neither obscene under Miller nor child
pornography under Ferber would nonetheless be subject to
prohibition. For example, a movie involving computer-generated
images that are "indistinguishable from" seventeen-year-olds
engaging in sexually explicit conduct may not qualify as obscenity or
child pornography, yet would still be prohibited by this act.11
Additionally, the COPPA strikes § 2256(8)(D) of the CPPA, the
subparagraph containing the term "conveys the impression. ' 12 In
effect, this elimination entirely removes the CPPA's prohibition on
material that "is advertised, promoted, presented, described, or
distributed in such a manner that conveys the impression that the
material is or contains a visual depiction of a minor engaging in
sexually explicit conduct." ' 3
The COPPA, however, prohibits
106. H.R. 1161, 108th Cong. (2003).
107. H.R. 1161 § 3(a). The new language in context reads: "such visual depiction is a
digital image that is, or is indistinguishablefrom, that of a minor engaging in sexually
explicit conduct." Id. (emphasis added).
108. The Court found the "appears to be" language of the CPPA unconstitutionally
overbroad in Free Speech Coalition,535 U.S. at 258.
109. Notably, Justice O'Connor advocated interpreting the "appears to be" language of
the CPPA as "is virtually indistinguishable from" in her concurring and dissenting opinion
in Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 265 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (stating that "[r]eading the statute only to bar images that are virtually
indistinguishable from actual children would not only assure that the ban on virtual-child
pornography is narrowly tailored, but would also assuage any fears that the 'appears to be
...of a minor' language is vague").
110. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
111. Notably, producers of such a movie are protected by the affirmative defense if
they can show that the material was produced without involving actual children.
112. H.R. 1161 § 4(a)(2).
113. See 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(D) (2000).
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producers and distributors from knowingly suggesting that material
portrays a minor engaging in sexually explicit material.114
The removal of this requirement-that the defendant prove that
the material was not promoted or distributed as containing depictions
of a minor engaged in sexually explicit activity-is redeeming, as this
requirement was found to be overbroad by the Court in Free Speech
Coalition.1"' The COPPA modification incorporating knowledge to
the defendant should alleviate the Court's concern that material
marketed as depicting minors is "unlawful in the hands of all who
receive it, though they bear no responsibility for how it was marketed,
sold, or described.""II6
Finally, Congress modified the affirmative defense of the CPPA
to read: "[I]t shall be an affirmative defense to a charge of violating
this section that the production of the alleged child pornography did
not involve the use of a minor or an attempt or conspiracy to commit
an offense under this section involving such use.""' 7 Hence, the
COPPA allows a defendant to show that either an adult or a
computer-generated image was used in production." 8
The amended affirmative defense provision, which exonerates a
defendant who can show that the image was not produced using
actual children, may resolve the issue of overbreadth. However, this
affirmative defense raises some of the same concerns that the Court
expressed with respect to the CPPA's affirmative defense. For
example, the revised affirmative defense, like the original, may apply
inconsistently to producers and possessors.' 19
That is, mere
possessors may have a more difficult time proving that actual children
were not used in the production of the material. Moreover, the
Court's position that "[t]he government raises serious constitutional
difficulties by seeking to impose on the defendant the burden of
proving his speech is not unlawful"' 120 is unlikely to be shaken. For
these reasons, it is improbable that the Court will find this revision to
the affirmative defense complete and sufficient. 2 '

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

H.R. 1161 § 4(b)(1).
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 258 (2002).
Id. at 258.
H.R. 1161 § 3(d).
Id.
See supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text.

120. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 255.

121. See id. at 256. The Court, in commenting on the affirmative defense of the CPPA,
stated, "Even if an affirmative defense can save a statute from First Amendment
challenge, here the defense is incomplete and insufficient." Id.
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Like the House of Representatives, the Senate considered
legislation prohibiting virtual child pornography following the Free
Speech Coalition decision. On April 30, 2003, the President signed
the Senate's Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end the
12 2
Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003 ("PROTECT Act").
Like the COPPA, the PROTECT Act modifies § 2256(8)(B), the
"appears to be" provision, of the CPPA. 23 The PROTECT Act also
revised the language to prohibit an image that "is, or is
indistinguishable from, that of a minor engaging in sexually explicit
conduct. 1 24 Again, this modification is subject to criticism as the
prohibition of "indistinguishable" images without consideration of
whether the images are obscene or whether actual children were
exploited in production does not find support under Miller or Ferber.
The PROTECT Act also removes the entire "conveys the
impression" portion of the CPPA located in § 2256(8)(D). 125 Like the
COPPA, the PROTECT Act incorporates a knowledge
requirement-limiting the violations of this section to a person who:
(3) knowingly(A) reproduces any child pornography for distribution
through the mails, or in interstate or foreign commerce
by any means, including by computer; or
(B) advertises, promotes, presents, distributes, or
solicits through the mails, or in interstate or foreign
commerce by any means, including by computer, any
material or purported material in a manner that reflects
the belief, or that is intended to cause another to
believe, that the material or purported material is, or
contains(i) an obscene visual depiction of a minor
engaging in sexually explicit conduct; or
(ii) a visual depiction of an1 26actual minor engaging
in sexually explicit conduct.
This knowledge requirement addresses the Court's concern in
Free Speech Coalition that the "conveys the impression" language of
122. Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 649.
123. § 502(a)(1), 117 Stat. at 678.
124. Id. The PROTECT Act further defines "indistinguishable" with respect to a
depiction as: "virtually indistinguishable, in that the depiction is such that an ordinary
person viewing the depiction would conclude that the depiction is of an actual minor
engaged in sexually explicit conduct." Id. § 502(c), 117 Stat. at 679.
125. Id. § 502(a)(3), 117 Stat. at 678.
126. Id. § 503(1)(A), 117 Stat. at 680.

2154

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81

the CPPA was overbroad in that it prohibited "possession of material
described, or pandered, as child pornography by someone earlier in
the distribution chain. ' 127 However,'the, PROTECT Act does include
a prohibition of possession of certain materials. 128 Specifically, the
PROTECT Act prohibits a person from knowingly possessing an
image that:
(1)(A) depicts a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct;
and
(B) is obscene; or
(2)(A) depicts an image that is, or appears to be, of a minor
engaging in graphic bestiality, sadistic or masochistic abuse,
or sexual intercourse, including genital-genital, oral-genital,
anal-genital, or oral-anal, whether between persons of the
same or opposite sex; and
(B) lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value. 129
This provision of the PROTECT Act is subject to constitutional
criticism. While Miller allowed the prohibition of obscene material
with respect to producers and distributors, 3 0 Stanley v. Georgia3'
provided that the government may not prohibit possession of obscene
material. 3 2 However, the government may have a strong argument
that the prohibition of the PROTECT Act, which requires that an
image is both obscene and depicts sexually explicit conduct of a
minor, is more closely related to the holding in Osborne, where the
prohibition of possession of child pornography was upheld.'33 It is
possible that the Court will find that the justifications for prohibiting
possession in Osborne, the protection of children and the goal of
destroying the market for child pornography, 34 also support a narrow
prohibition of possession of obscene virtual child pornography.
Finally, the PROTECT Act, like the COPPA, calls for an
amended affirmative defense.'35 This affirmative defense requires a
defendant to prove either that the production involved actual persons

127. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 258 (2002).
128. § 504(a), 117 Stat. at 680-81.
129. Id.
130. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 16-17 (1973).
131. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
132. Id. at 559.
133. Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990).
134. Id. at 108-09.
135. Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children
Today Act (PROTECT Act) of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 502(d), 117 Stat. 649,679-80.
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who were adults at the time of production or that no minors were
used in production.'36 The affirmative defense here -is virtually no
different than that in the COPPA., Although the PROTECT Act
affirmative defense appears to give a defendant the option of showing
either that adults were .used in the production or that no children
were used, these two choices could be condensed. That is, the
PROTECT Act, like the COPPA, could simply require the defendant
to show that no children were used in production.'37 Therefore, this
affirmative defense is subject to the same criticisms as the COPPA's;
specifically, the affirmative defense in the PROTECT Act imposes a
heavy burden on the defendant and applies inconsistently to
producers and possessors. 38 Nonetheless, where so much of the
statutorily prohibited material resembles speech that the Supreme
Court has already found to be unprotected by the First Amendment,
this act may not need to rely on an affirmative defense to save its
constitutionality.
For these reasons, the PROTECT Act is a
promising attempt to address both distribution and possession of
virtual child pornography.
Another approach to banning virtual child pornography that
Congress has taken involves existing obscenity laws. On July 23,
2002, Congress proposed a concurrent resolution that supported the
vigorous enforcement of federal obscenity laws.'39
Stricter
enforcement of existing obscenity laws is a good attempt to banish
virtual child pornography, yet this approach will not completely
satisfy Congress's objective.
Although arguably many of the
materials that the CPPA sought to prohibit satisfy the obscenity test
defined in Miller, Miller only applies to the production and
distribution of obscenity. Furthermore, it is difficult to define
precisely what constitutes "serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value"' 4 ° as required by the third prong of the Miller test. 4 '
136. Id.
137. One way the defendant may satisfy this burden is by showing that production
involved only adults. Notably, the affirmative defense of the PROTECT Act and the
COPPA is broader than the CPPA's affirmative defense which only allowed a producer to
evade prosecution by showing that the material was produced using only adults. See 18
U.S.C. § 2252A(c) (2000).
138. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
139. H.R. Con. Res. 445, 107th Cong. (2002). "Whereas vigorous enforcement of
obscenity laws can help reduce the amount of 'virtual child pornography' now readily
available to sexual predators ... it is the sense of Congress that the Federal obscenity laws
should be vigorously enforced throughout the United States." Id.
140. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
141. See id. For example, some internet pornographers have tried to avoid falling
under the Miller obscenity standard by providing some "value" on their Web sites. See,
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The enforcement of obscenity laws is not a completely futile attempt
by Congress to eliminate virtual child pornography, however, because
production and distribution are irmportant parts of the problem.
Undoubtedly, the Supreme Court will support Congress's efforts in
this area. 42 Therefore, the strict enforcement of obscenity laws could
make a solid contribution to accomplishing the goal of prohibiting
virtual child pornography while honoring the value of freedom of
speech.
Congress's commitment to the strict enforcement of obscenity
laws coupled with legislation that complies with Supreme Court
precedent is the best approach to banning virtual child pornography.
Legislation that is closely tailored to traditionally unprotected
categories of speech is a promising attempt to avoid the dilemma of
overbreadth found by the Court in its analysis of the CPPA in Free
Speech Coalition.
In Free Speech Coalition, the Supreme Court was faced with the
difficult task of balancing Congress's interest in protecting children

from harm with the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech. In
finding the CPPA unconstitutional, the Court was not necessarily
showing preference for the latter. Rather, Free Speech Coalition
recognized that there were already measures in place to ensure
children's safety while preserving the right to free speech. Instead of
struggling to get around the Free Speech Coalition decision in an
attempt to eradicate virtual child pornography, Congress should use
the opportunity to improve upon established means of prosecuting
unprotected speakers. Recent legislation that incorporates Courtapproved prohibition of speech and stricter enforcement of obscenity
laws are the best vehicles for banning virtual child pornography while
imposing the least threat to protected speech.
SARA C. MARCY

e.g., Adult Web Law, at http://www.adultweblaw.com/laws/obscene.htm (last visited May
20, 2003) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (explaining that Web site
producers "might want to consider displaying or linking to content that has something
other than masturbatory value such as information about health care issues in the adult
entertainment industry, safe sex information, a discussion of fetishes, or political links to
other websites"). Especially in light of this effort, the prosecution of obscenity cases
should be improved upon by more specifically defining what constitutes "value."
142. The Court specifically allowed the prohibition of production and distribution of
obscene material in Miller, 413 U.S. at 23.

